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SUMMARY 
 
Legislation regulating minimum sentences in South Africa was re-introduced by 
sections 51 to 53 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 which came into 
operation on 1 May 1998.  These provisions were regarded as a temporary measure 
to be effective for two years, where after they were extended from time to time.  After 
they had been extended for several times, section 51 was rendered permanent on 31 
December 2007 by the Criminal Law (Sentencing) Amendment Act 38 of 2007.  At 
the same time sections 52 and 53 were repealed by the same Act. 
 
Minimum sentence legislation was the result of a call by the community for heavier 
penalties and for the offenders to serve more realistic terms of imprisonment.  There 
was also a general dissatisfaction about the perceived leniency of sentences 
imposed by the courts for serious crimes.  During 1996 and in the wake of these 
concerns the Minister of Justice requested the South African Law Reform 
Commission to investigate all aspects of sentencing in South Africa. 
 
A Project Committee chaired by a judge of the High Court was appointed and it 
operated from the late 1996 to March 1998.  Minimum sentences for certain serious 
crimes were one of the options to be investigated by the Project Committee. 
Consequent to this the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997 was promulgated 
with effect from 1 May 1998.  The legislature intended this Act to defer criminal 
activity, to avoid disparities in sentencing and to deal harshly with perpetrators of 
serious offences.  The subsequent amendments to the Act included the granting of 
jurisdiction to the Regional court to pass life imprisonment, an automatic right of 
appeal against life imprisonment in respect of a juvenile accused and identification of 
circumstances that do not constitute substantial and compelling circumstances.  
Judicial discretion and departure from prescribed minimum sentences had initially 
presented a problem regarding its interpretation in a variety of cases in our courts.  
Eventually our courts came up with a clear interpretation of the meaning of the 
phrase substantial and compelling circumstances. 
 
iv 
This research project will analyze the provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 
105 of 1997 with regard to minimum sentences for certain serious offences.  In the 
process case law and other literature will be discussed regarding the interpretation of 
minimum sentence provisions in the Act.  Recommendations for legislation which will 
cover the aspect of sentencing on a wider scale are made. 
 
1 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Minimum sentence legislation in South Africa was introduced by sections 51 to 53 of 
the Criminal Law Amendment Act1 which came into operation on 1 May 1998.  The 
provisions of this Act were initially to be in effect for two years but, it was extended 
later.  This Act lists certain serious offences such as murder, robbery and rape and 
identifies actual situations in which mandatory sentences, including life imprisonment 
for murder and rape, must be imposed. 
 
The Act further provides that the court may deviate from the minimum sentence 
prescribed if it finds substantial and compelling circumstances, justifying a lesser 
sentence.  This legislation was the result of a call from the community for heavier 
penalties and for offenders to serve more realistic terms of imprisonment.  There was 
also dissatisfaction from the general public in South Africa about the leniency of 
sentences for serious offences. 
 
1.2 DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM 
 
Since the inception of the Act, there has been a wide range of responses to the 
impact of this legislation with regard to sentencing.  The problem to be investigated is 
whether this legislation has achieved its purpose, ie whether it has succeeded in 
addressing the concerns that existed prior to its promulgation.  A further question is 
whether there is a need to improve on the current legislation.  The study will also 
determine whether this legislation should be replaced by a legislative instrument to 
regulate the whole sentencing framework in South Africa. 
 
                                                          
1
  Act 105 of 1997 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 
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1.3 AIMS AND OBJECTIVES  
 
The aim of the study is to establish whether the Act adequately improved sentencing 
in South Africa, whether it has had adequate impact on serious and violent crimes 
and crime in general; whether it has achieved any consistency in sentencing and 
whether public perceptions that sentences were not sufficiently severe, have been 
adequately addressed. 
 
The objectives of this study include the question as to whether this legislation deters 
criminal activity and avoids disparities in sentencing.  Furthermore it must be 
established if there is a need for improvement of this legislation or whether it should 
be replaced by another instrument to regulate the sentencing framework in South 
Africa. 
 
1.4 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
The research involves the identification of the general principles of sentencing in 
South Africa.  Secondly, the analysis of data available on the subject, which include 
literature on the subject and case law, will be discussed.  Once this is done the 
research will evaluate the legislation in order to establish if it has succeeded in its 
purpose.  Recommendations will then be made regarding the solution to the problem. 
 
1.5 FEASIBILITY 
 
The aims and objectives of the research are achievable given the questions, 
arguments and debate arising from literature and case law.  Literature is readily 
available from University Libraries in South Africa.  The data will be in the form of text 
books, articles from law journals and other periodicals.  The other source will be 
articles on the internet.  The data will be identified, analyzed and applied to achieve 
the desired outcome of the research. 
 
In the next chapter minimum legislation will be discussed in detail. 
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CHAPTER 2 
MINIMUM SENTENCE LEGISLATION 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
 
A minimum sentence is a sentence with a lower limit, giving the court discretion to 
impose a higher sentence.2  In the history of our penal system a number of attempts 
were made to limit the sentencing discretion of our courts by providing for mandatory 
minimum sentences.3  Minimum sentences thereafter fell out of favour as they were 
subjected to strong criticism.  In S v Toms; S v Bruce4 for example, Chief Justice 
Corbett held that the imposition of mandatory sentences by the legislature had 
always been considered as an undesirable intrusion upon the sentencing function of 
the courts.  
 
Legislation regulating minimum sentences in South Africa was re-introduced by 
sections 51 to 53 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act5 which came into operation on 
1 May 1998.  These provisions were meant to be a temporary measure, to be 
effective for two years.  Thereafter these provisions were extended from time to time.  
Their operation was extended for twelve months with effect from 1 May 2000,6 for two 
years with effect from 1 May 2001,7 for two years with effect from 1 May 2003,8 for 
two years with effect from 1 May 20059 and for two years with effect from 1 May 
2007.10  However section 51 was rendered permanent by the Criminal Law 
(Sentencing) Amendment Act.11  It is important to note that prior to this amendment 
                                                          
2
  Terblanche A Guide to Sentencing in South Africa 2
nd
 ed (2007) 42 para 2.1. 
3
  For example Dangerous Weapons Act 71 of 1968 and The Abuse of Dependance-Producing 
Substances and Rehabilitation Centres Act 41 of 1971. 
4
  1990 (2) SA 802 (A) at 817 C-D. 
5
  Fn 1. 
6
  Government Gazette 21122 GN 23, 20 April 2000. 
7
  Government Gazette 7059 GN 29, 30 April 2001. 
8
   Government Gazette 24804 GN 40, 30 April 2003. 
9
   Government Gazette 27549 GN 21, 29 April 2005. 
10
   Government Gazette 29831 GN 10, 25 April 2007. 
11
   Act 38 of 2007 which came into operation on 31 December 2007.  Sections 2 and 3(a) of this 
Act repealed ss 52 and 53 of Act 105 of 1997. 
4 
the title of section 51 referred to Mandatory Minimum Sentences.  However, after this 
amendment the word “mandatory” was substituted with “discretionary”. 
 
Minimum sentence legislation was the result of a call by the community for heavier 
penalties and for the offenders to serve more realistic terms of imprisonment.  There 
was also a general dissatisfaction about the perceived leniency of sentences 
imposed by the courts for serious crimes.  The following serve as examples of such 
dissatisfaction from the general public in South Africa: 
 
(a) “The liberal press calls it „Public Enemy No1‟.  Many social sectors are calling 
to end the moratorium on death penalty.  The well-off and poor communities 
are scared.  Blacks and whites are talking about crime.  In the meantime the 
new government is trying to find a solution to the „crime‟ problem advocating 
a lot of „tough‟ measures to deal with criminals and apparent lawlessness that 
is taking over the country.”12 
 
(b) “People are being murdered, raped, abused and hacked, either through 
political, recreational or gangster violence.  Chaos reigns without control.”13  
 
(c) “We will never be in a position to bring the epidemic of serious economic 
crime and corruption in South Africa to an end if we do not bring in new 
structures to deal with it.”14  
 
(d) “You all talk about the philosophy behind crime and give reasons for it.  But I 
… (cannot use) reason or the constitution with a man holding a gun on my 
head.”15  
 
(e) “Die straf wat opgelê word vir die kindermolestering en kindermishandeling is 
absoluut onbevredigend.  Daarom neem dit so drasties toe.”16  
 
                                                          
12
  Daniel Nina Mail and Guardian January 6-12, 1995. 
13
  The Citizen Thursday, 26 October 1995. 
14
  Pretoria News Thursday, 26 October 1995. 
15
  The Star 25 October 1995. 
16
  Beeld Donderdag, 26 Oktober 1996. 
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(f) “Tough jail sentences should be imposed on child abusers and this could be 
the only deterrent against child abuse.  We have told Mr Omar that the 
sentences meted out for offenders were too lenient and that new laws with 
stiffer sentences had to be introduced.”17 
 
(g) “ŉ Minimum vonnis en strawwer vonnisse kan vir kindermoleesterders 
ingestel word omdat huidige vonnisse nie ŉ voldoende afskrikmiddel vir die 
gemeenskap blyk te wees nie.”18 
 
(h) “One reads in the newspapers everyday about aggrieved parties who more 
and more start taking the law into their own hands said Mr Justice T 
Grobbelaar.  „Years ago the Appeal Court already warned that if serious 
crimes were not punished with severe sentences it would cause people to 
take the law into their own hands, at the end of the day leading to total 
chaos‟.”19  
 
(i) “A Correctional Services official told a court that a person with a life sentence 
would automatically be considered for parole after 20 years.”20  
 
From the above it is clear that the government had enough evidence for it to take 
action as matter of urgency. 
 
2.2 GOVERNMENT ACTION 
 
During 1996 and in the wake of these concerns the then Minister of Justice and 
Constitutional Development, Mr Dullah Omar, requested the South African Law 
Reform Commission21 to investigate all aspects of sentencing in South Africa.  A 
project Committee under the leadership of Judge Leonora van der Heever operated 
                                                          
17
  Sowetan Friday, 10 November 1995. 
18
  Beeld Woensdag, 22 November 1995. 
19
  Pretoria News Thursday, 23 November 1995. 
20
  The Citizen Saturday, 25 November 1995. 
21
  Then known as the South African Law Commission (hereinafter referred to as “the 
Commission”).  The name was changed by s 5 of the Judicial Matters Amendment Act 55 of 
2002, as from 17 January 2003 to South African Law Reform Commission. 
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from the late 1996 to March 1998.  The Minister of Justice also asked this committee 
to investigate the desirability of the Legislative determination of minimum and 
maximum sentences.  
 
In 1997 the committee produced an issue paper no. 11 entitled “[Project 82] 
Sentencing: Mandatory Minimum Sentences”.  During their research the committee 
examined the sentencing regimes in England and Wales, Sweden, United States of 
America, Germany, Canada and Greece. 
 
A number of justifications for these nations‟ guidelines and minimum sentencing 
regimes included the following: 
 
(a) Retribution or just deserts - it is argued that punishment should fit the severity 
of the crime and that past leniency should be corrected; 
 
(b) incapacitation - it is vital to ensure the incapacitation of serious offenders to 
protect the community; 
 
(c) disparity - mandatory minimum sentences are held to reduce unwarranted 
disparity in sentencing; and 
 
(d) inducement of co-operation - mandatory minimums may help induce 
defendants to co-operate with authorities.22 
 
The committee then considered the following sentencing guidelines for sentencing 
reform:23 
 
2.2.1 ENACTMENT OF SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PRESUMPTIVE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
 
One option is to set up a sentencing commission to develop sentencing guidelines in 
respect of certain offences.  In this regard the best example is the Minnesota 
                                                          
22
  South African Law Reform Commission Report (Project 82) Sentencing: Mandatory Minimum 
Sentences; Issue Paper 11; 1997, para 3.33. 
23
   Fn 22 ch 4. 
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sentencing guidelines in the United States of America where the enabling statute 
directed the sentencing commission to develop guidelines, which were to specify 
presumptively correct prison commitment and prison duration rules.  Specific 
principles are used as determinants of the presumptive correct sentence, for example 
the severity of the offence and the accused‟s criminal record.  The court is allowed to 
depart from the presumptive correct sentence only if special circumstances exist. 
 
2.2.2 VOLUNTARY SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
 
This option requires the development of sentencing guidelines, which are not 
required by law to be followed, but which simply guide the courts in the exercise of 
their discretion.  Such policies are based on past sentencing practices but may be 
elaborated either by appellate courts or more formally by a sentencing commission or 
council.24 
 
2.2.3 THE ADOPTION OF LEGISLATIVE GUIDELINES THAT ASSIST IN 
DETERMINING THE CHOICE AND LENGTH OF THE PUNISHMENT 
 
This option is based on the Swedish model, which provides that the legislature 
determines the nature of punishment and the penal value attributed to the particular 
offence.  The penal value is determined with special regard to the harm, offence or 
risk which the conduct involved and what the accused realized or should have 
realized about the conduct including his intentions or motives. 
 
2.2.4 THE ENACTMENT OF PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING, INCLUDING 
GUIDELINES THAT DETERMINE THE IMPOSITION OF IMPRISONMENT 
 
This option is based on the proposals of the Canadian Sentencing Commission, 
which recommended the enactment of the principles of sentencing.  Provision is 
made; inter alia, for principles governing the determination of the sentence, that is, 
that the sentence should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the 
degree of responsibility of the offender for the offence.  In addition, a number of 
factors are listed which the court has to consider in determining the sentence, 
including, aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the need for consistency in 
                                                          
24
  Fn 22 para 4.2. 
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sentencing offenders for similar offences committed, the need not to impose 
excessive sentences, the fact that imprisonment should not be imposed solely for the 
purposes of rehabilitation and the circumstances under which imprisonment should 
be imposed.25 
 
2.2.5 THE ENACTMENT OF PRESUMPTIVE SENTENCING GUIDELINES TO 
GUIDE THE IMPOSITION OF CUSTODIAL AND NON-CUSTODIAL 
SENTENCES 
 
Presumptive guidance takes the form of statutory orders that impose a 
predetermined sentence range to the judge.  Although presumptive guidelines are 
statutory in nature they can allow the continued existence of sentencing discretion if 
the judge is allowed to deviate from the adopted range under certain circumstances. 
 
2.2.6 THE ENACTMENT OF MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCES COMBINED 
WITH THE DISCRETION TO DEPART FROM THE SENTENCES UNDER 
CERTAIN CONDITIONS 
 
This option implies the enactment of a mandatory minimum sentence26 coupled with 
discretion to the sentencing officer to depart from the prescribed sentence if special 
circumstances exist.  In such circumstances the sentencing court is required to 
record the circumstances and to give written reasons for departure from the 
prescribed sentence.27 
 
Furthermore the Issue Paper recommended that the issues raised be discussed and 
debated thoroughly before any particular direction was taken.  The committee 
considered the sentencing practices in South Africa and summarized points of 
criticism as follows:28 
 
(a) The existence of a sentencing discretion is the source of inconsistency and 
disparity in sentencing practices in South Africa.  
 
                                                          
25
  Fn 22 para 4.5. 
26
  For example 15, 20 and 25 years imprisonment for the first, second and third conviction 
respectively. 
27
  For example The Minnesota Guidelines. 
28
  Fn 22 para 2.46. 
9 
(b) The legislative framework for control of the sentencing discretion is too broad 
and it enhances inconsistency and disparity in sentencing practices. 
 
(c) The principles developed by the courts to limit or control the sentencing 
discretion are ineffective. 
 
(d) The principles upon which a superior court will interfere with a sentence 
imposed by the court of first instance are vague and the lower courts are in 
desperate need of a comprehensive set of principles which can be used as 
basic guidelines in sentencing. 
 
(e) There is great uncertainty as to which sentencing aim or theory should be 
pursued. In some cases it is suggested that deterrence is the most important 
consideration while others emphasize retribution or rehabilitation. 
 
(f) There is a clear absence of a systematic approach to sentencing. 
 
(g) Attempts by the legislature to control the sentencing discretion by the 
introduction of mandatory minimum sentences elicited strong criticism.  In the 
Viljoen Commission‟s report the Commission expressed its opposition to 
interference with the judicial discretion in the form of prescribing minimum 
sentences and sentences for corrective training (2-4 years), prevention of 
crime (5-8 years) and the indeterminate sentence (9-15 years).  It 
recommended that minimum sentences be abolished (and sentences for 
corrective training and prevention of crime were subsequently removed from 
the statute book). 
 
(h) There is a clear absence of a structured sentencing policy and sentencing 
guidelines. 
 
(i) Most sentencing officers appear to approach the question of sentencing in an 
intuitive and unscientific manner. 
 
(j) Sentencing practices fail to protect the community from criminals committing 
serious offence. 
10 
 
(k) Release of convicted prisoners by the Parole Board before expiration of their 
sentences is severely criticized. It is regarded as interference by the 
Executive in the functions of the courts. 
 
(l) Academics have highlighted a number of factors which were in the past 
regarded as justification for discrimination in sentencing, for example race, 
gender, class, economic position and political background.  
 
(m) Many sentencing officers imposed sentences with a specific political 
background as point of departure. 
 
The committee also realized that, failure by the legislature to provide a clear and 
unambiguous legislative framework for the exercise of the sentencing discretion; 
failure by the courts to develop firm rules for the exercise of the sentencing discretion 
and failure by the courts and the legislature to give firm guidance as to which 
sentencing theories or aims carry the most weight, brought much uncertainty and 
inconsistency into the sentencing process in South Africa.29 
 
Unfortunately the van der Heever Committee completed its term of office without 
consolidation of its work in a discussion paper or in draft legislation proposals.  This 
was occasioned by the rush to enact legislation giving effect to stricter sentencing 
laws.  The government was under pressure to do so following the public perception 
that the government was not taking the crime problem seriously.  The closing date for 
comment on the Issue Paper was the end of September 1997, however, by then the 
legislation was already being considered in the National Assembly, the work of the 
Portfolio Committee having been finalized, in November 1997. 
 
During the Second Reading Debate on this Bill on 6 November 1997, the Minister of 
Justice described the introduction of minimum sentences for certain serious offences 
as “an important matter for our country and in the fight against crime in particular”.30  
The Minister also acknowledged the existence of the arguments for and against the 
                                                          
29
  Fn 22 para 2.45. 
30
   Hansard 6 November 1997, columns 6080 – 6120. 
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introduction of minimum sentencing framework.  He summarized the arguments 
against the introduction of minimum sentences as follows:31 
 
(a) A statutory obligation on the courts to impose minimum sentences impinges 
on the independence of the judiciary. 
 
(b) The introduction of minimum sentences will undermine, instead of 
strengthen, the administration of justice. 
 
(c) Mandatory minimum sentences set the wrong tone for sentencing reform in 
South Africa. 
 
(d) Mandatory minimum sentences have, in the past, elicited very severe 
criticisms. 
 
He then summarized the main arguments in favour of the introduction of minimum 
sentences as follows:32 
 
(a) There is a public demand for more stringent punishment for convicted 
offenders. 
 
(b) The introduction of minimum sentences will help to restore confidence in the 
ability of the criminal justice system to protect the public against crime. 
 
(c) The introduction of minimum sentences confirms the Government‟s policy, 
which aims to curb the increasing crime rate and to protect the community 
against criminals. 
 
(d) In terms of the proposed legislation, the courts are granted discretion to 
deviate from the prescribed minimum sentences.  The introduction of 
minimum sentences could therefore not be regarded, in the Bill, as being 
interference with the independence of the judiciary. 
 
                                                          
31
  Fn 30 at 6084 – 66120. 
32
  Fn 30 at 6086. 
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(e) And most importantly, those provisions relating to minimum sentences are 
designed to ensure that our courts are able to deal effectively, in terms of 
sentencing, with the kinds of serious crimes which we have witnessed in our 
country and which our people unfortunately still experience. 
 
2.3 INTERPRETATION OF THE ACT 
 
As is the case with all the other legislation, interpretation of the Act is important in 
order to determine the intention of the legislature. 
 
Our courts have interpreted the intention of the legislature as follows: 
 
In S v Willemse33 the court held that another and cogent reason for the amendment 
was the deterrent effect of the new minimum sentences. 
 
In S v Mofokeng and Another,34 the court held that deterrence appears to be the 
principal concern of the Legislature in the imposition of the severe minimum 
sentences upon which it has decided even before the offences are committed.  
However the court endorsed deterrence and retribution as the intended purposes of 
this legislation in S v Homareda.35  The court also disapproved the notion that these 
purposes can only be achieved through obligatory sentencing or prescribed minimum 
sentences which have failed in the past in respect of drugs and drug trafficking.36 
 
The court further referred to the case of S v Makwanyane and Another37 where 
Chalskalson P held that the greatest deterrent to crime is the likelihood that the 
offenders will be apprehended, convicted and punished.  In S v Kgafela,38 the court 
emphasized the aspects of deterrence and retribution to be heavily relied on where 
the courts imposed minimum sentence for the purpose of combating crime.  
                                                          
33
   1999 (1) SACR 450 (C) at 454 c. 
34
  1999 (1) SACR 502 (W) at 526 a. 
35
   1999 (2) SACR 319 (W) at 324 h. 
36
  Fn 20 at 325 e. 
37
   1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) at 122. 
38
   2001 (2) SACR 207 (B) at para [23]. 
13 
Booysens AJ in S v Snyders,39 affirmed the retributive aspect of punishment 
concluding that it was clear that the Legislature intended that the perpetrators of the 
serious offences referred to in the Act should be harshly dealt with.  
 
In Centre for the Child Law v Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development and 
Others40 Cameron J held that there can be no doubt that the intention and effect of 
the minimum sentencing regime introduced in May 1998 was to impose a harsher 
system of sentencing for the scheduled crimes.  In S v Blaauw41 the court referred to 
the case of S v Majalefa and Another42 where Leveson J expressed the view “that the 
purpose of the legislation was to avoid disparities in sentencing”. 
 
In S v Montgomery43 the court acknowledged that the dual purpose of this legislation 
referred firstly, to deterrence and retribution and secondly, to intention to avoid 
situations where surprisingly disparate sentences are imposed by different courts for 
a particular offence.  In S v Zitha and Others44 the court disapproved the notion of 
disparity in sentencing and it found difficulty in accepting that the purpose of the 
Legislature in enacting the provisions concerned was to address disparity in 
sentencing. 
 
 Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers45 hold the view that the stated intention of the legislature 
with the introduction of the minimum sentencing provisions in 1997 was to reduce 
serious and violent crime, to achieve consistency in sentencing, and to address 
public perceptions that sentences were not sufficiently severe. 
 
                                                          
39
   2000 (2) SACR 125 (NC) at 129 e. 
40
   2009 (2) SACR 477 (CC) at para [16]. 
41
   1999 (2) SACR 295 (W) at 303 A. 
42
   Unreported judgment of the Witwatersrand Local Division delivered on 22 October 1998. 
43
   2000 (2) SACR 318 (N) at 322 H. 
44
   1999 (2) SACR 404 (W) at 409 E. 
45
   A Pyrrhic Victory?  Mandatory and minimum sentences in South Africa ISS Paper 111 July 
2005. 
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According to Tait46 the stated intention of the legislation was to promote consistency 
in sentencing, to address public concerns regarding the need to be “tough on crime” 
and to reduce the levels of serious and violent crime. 
 
According to Roth47 one of the reasons for Parliament‟s decision to adopt mandatory 
minimum sentencing regime was its belief that it would deter violent crime.  She 
further states that Parliament expected mandatory minimums to reduce sentencing 
disparities as well. 
 
In the next chapter the structure of minimum sentence legislation will be discussed. 
                                                          
46
  Conference Report on sentencing in South Africa held at Commodore Hotel, V & A Waterfront 
Cape Town on 15 – 26 October 2006. 
47
   2008 Minnesota Journal of International Law – South African Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: 
Reform required at pages 4 – 5. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE STRUCTURE OF THE MINIMUM SENTENCE LEGISLATION AS 
CONTAINED IN ACT 105 OF 1997 
 
3.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the structure of the relevant legislation will be discussed.  The 
discussion will reflect on the details of the Act including the relevant categories of 
offences. 
 
Section 51 of the Act prescribes various minimum terms of imprisonment for the 
variety of serious offences described in section 3.1 herein.  These are predominantly 
the offences committed in the circumstances thought to render the perpetrator 
especially blameworthy and attracting particular public concern at the time. 
 
3.2  OFFENCES TO WHICH THE SENTENCES APPLY 
 
The categories of offences concerned are grouped under different Parts of Schedule 
2 to the Act.  The offences provided for in Part 1of Schedule 2 to the Act include 
murder; rape; compelled rape; any offence referred to in certain sections of the 
Protection of constitutional Democracy against Terrorist and Related Activity Act 
2004, when certain circumstances as stipulated in Schedule 2 exist and the offence 
of trafficking in persons for sexual purposes in terms of section 71(1) or (2) of the 
Criminal Law (Sexual offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007. 
 
The offences in Part II include murder (in the circumstances other than those 
mentioned in Part I); robbery in specified circumstances and any offence relating to 
Drugs and drug Trafficking Act, 199248 in specified circumstances. 
 
The offences referred to in Part III include rape or compelled rape as contemplated in 
section 3 or 4 of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) 
Amendment Act, 2007, respectively in circumstances other than those referred to in 
                                                          
48
   Act No 140 of 1992. 
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Part I; sexual exploitation of a child or sexual exploitation of a person who is mentally 
disabled as contemplated in section 12 or 23 of the said Act or using a child 
pornography or using a person who is mentally disabled for pornographic purposes 
as contemplated in section 20(1) or 26(1) of the said Act respectively; assault with 
intent to do grievous bodily harm on a child under the age of 16 years; any offence in 
contravention of section 36 of the Arms and Ammunition Act, 196949 on account of 
being in possession of 1000 rounds of ammunition intended for firing in an arm 
contemplated in section 39(2)(a)(i) of that Act and any trafficking related offence by a 
commercial carrier as contemplated in section 71(6) of the Criminal Law (Sexual 
Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act, 2007. 
 
Part IV provides for the following offences: if the accused person had with him or her 
at the time a firearm which was intended for use as such in the commission of such 
offence; treason; sedition; public violence; robbery other than robbery referred to in 
Part I or II; kidnapping; an offence involving an assault, when a dangerous wound is 
inflicted with a firearm, other than an offence referred to in Part I, II or III; breaking or 
entering any premises, whether under common law or statutory provision, with intent 
to commit an offence and lastly escaping from lawful custody. 
 
Section 51(1) applies to offences referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 to the Act.  It 
places a duty on the High or Regional court to impose life imprisonment on an 
offender that is convicted of these offences.  The phrase “notwithstanding any other 
law” in section 51(1) means that if any other law provides otherwise, section 51(1) will 
apply.50  The phrase “… but subject to subsections (3) and (6) ...” means that when 
the conditions provided for in these subsections exist, the minimum sentence regime 
finds no application.  
 
Section 51(2) of the Act applies to offences referred to in Part II to IV of Schedule2.  
It imposes a duty similar to subsection (1) in the sense that a minimum term of 
imprisonment has to be imposed by the court for such offences. 
 
                                                          
49
   Act No 75 of 1969. 
50
  Fn 1 pg 47 paragraph 3.5.2. 
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Subsection 3(a) contains the main exception ie substantial and compelling 
circumstances, which re-instates the sentencing discretion of the court.51  Subsection 
3(aA) provides for the circumstances which do not qualify as constituting substantial 
and compelling circumstances. 
 
3.3 OTHER MATTERS DEALT WITH BY THE ACT 
 
3.3.1 NOTICE TO THE ACCUSED OF MINIMUM SENTENCE 
 
It is now established practice that the court has a duty to inform an unrepresented 
accused about the provisions of the Act if applicable at the inception of the trial.  The 
application of the provisions of the Act must be reflected in the charge sheet.  This 
duty arises from the decisions of our courts.52 
 
In S v Mseleku53 Pillay J held that where no mention of the provisions of the Act is 
made in the indictment, notwithstanding its factual framework, the provisions should 
be brought to the attention of the accused by the court whether he is represented or 
not. 
 
3.3.2  TIME SPENT IN PRISON BEFORE SENTENCE AS A MITIGATING 
FACTOR 
 
In S v Gqamana,54 Thring J considered it a mitigating factor, the fact that the accused 
had been in custody awaiting trial and sentence for a period of some two years and 
eight months (together with other factors cumulatively). 
 
On this point, the court in S v Vilakazi and Others,55 Goldstein J, held that the court  
would be loathe in the absence of clear evidence to decide that the miseries of the 
awaiting trial period are more oppressive than those of the post sentence one. 
 
                                                          
51
  Fn 36 para 3.5.3. 
52
  See S v Dlamini 2000 (2) SACR 266 (T); S v Ndlovu 2003 (1) SACR 331 (SCA); S v Makatu 
2006 (2) SACR 582 (SCA). 
53
  2006 (2) SACR 574 (D). 
54
  2001 (2) SACR 28 (C) at 37g-i. 
55
  2000 (1) SACR 140 (W) at 148 e. 
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3.3.3  NEW PENALTY CLAUSES 
 
On the question of whether the Act has created new penalty clauses for the offences 
listed there, the court in S v Legoa56 held that the Act does not create new offences 
but refers to specific forms of existing offences.  Further that when the commission of 
those offences is proved in the form specified in the Schedule, the sentencing court 
acquires an enhanced penalty jurisdiction. 
 
3.3.4  NO RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION 
 
In S v Willemse,57 Foxcroft J held that section 51 of the Act does not have retroactive 
effect and it was therefore not applicable to offences committed before the Act came 
into operation on 1 May 1998. 
 
3.4 THE SUBSEQUENT AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT 
 
The following amendments have been effected to the Act: 
 
(a) The Act has been rendered permanent by the repeal of sections 53(1) and 
(2) of the Act.58  In essence the requirement that the legislation be 
reconsidered bi-annually has been abolished. 
 
(b) The regional courts now have jurisdiction to pass sentence of life 
imprisonment in respect of the offences mentioned in Part 1 of Schedule 2 to 
the Act.59  This therefore addressed the problem of the split procedure which 
was provided for in the erstwhile section 52.  There is no more referral of 
cases for sentence by the High Court. 
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  2003 (1) SACR 13 SCA at para [18]. 
57
  Fn 18 at 456 a- b. 
58
  Fn 7. 
59
  S 51(1) of the Act. 
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(c) The Act grants an automatic right of appeal against life imprisonment 
imposed by the Regional Court.60  The Regional Court‟s jurisdiction to pass 
life imprisonment was accompanied by the automatic right to appeal to the 
High Court.  However, this right was subsequently abolished by the Child 
Justice Act61 in respect of adult offenders only with effect from I April 2010.62  
This entails that an adult offender is now required to apply for leave to appeal 
against life imprisonment in terms of section 309B of Act 51 of 1977. 
 
(d) The Act prescribes that certain circumstances do not constitute substantial 
and compelling circumstances on a charge of rape.63  This therefore limited 
the deviation from the prescribed sentences in rape cases. 
   
 The relevant section reads: 
 
“(i) The complainant‟s previous sexual history; 
 
(ii) An apparent lack of physical injury to the complainant; 
 
(iii) An accused person‟s cultural or religious beliefs about rape; 
 
(iv)  any relationship that existed between the accused and the complainant 
prior to the commission of the offence.” 
 
(e) The Act creates an exception to the rule that minimum sentences cannot be 
suspended.64  The minimum sentences may now be suspended up to half if 
the offender was 16 or 17 at the time of the commission of the offence. 
 
(f) The Act also regulates transitional arrangements in respect of cases pending 
committal to the High Court before 31 December 2007.65 
 
(g) The Act Creates new categories of murder added to Part I of Schedule 2 to 
the Act.66  These are the instances where the victim was killed in order to 
                                                          
60
  S 309(1)(a)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
61
   No 75 of 2008. 
62
   Ss 84(1) and 99(1) of Act 75 of 2008. 
63
  S 51(3)(aA) of the Act. 
64
  S 51(5)(b) of the Act. 
65
  S 53A of the Act. 
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unlawfully remove any body part of the victim or as a result of such unlawful 
removal of a body part of the victim; or the death of the victim resulted from 
or is directly related to any offence contemplated in section 1(a) to (e) of the 
Witchcraft Suppression Act.67 
 
(h)  Part IV of schedule 2 to the Act has been substituted as a whole.  This part 
now refers to the offences of treason; sedition; public violence; robbery other 
than robbery referred to in Part I or II of this schedule and kidnapping, if the 
accused had with him or her at the time a firearm which was intended for use 
as such, in the commission of such offence. 
 
Other offences included in this part are escaping from lawful custody; breaking or 
entering any premises, whether under common law or a statutory provision, with 
intent to commit an offence and an offence involving an assault, when a dangerous 
wound is inflicted with a firearm, other than an offence referred to in Part I, II or III 
Schedule 2. 
 
However the wisdom of giving the Regional Court such a high penal jurisdiction has 
been found to be questionable on the basis that life imprisonment is the ultimate 
penalty in the absence of death penalty.  Furthermore it would be expected that 
cases which call for life imprisonment should be tried by the High Court which is the 
highest trial court for criminal cases in the country.68  
 
Judicial discretion and departure from the prescribed minimum sentence as provided 
for in section 51(3)(a) of the Act have presented some problems in practice.  It is 
against this background that judicial discretion is discussed in the next chapter.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
66
  Para (e) and (f) of Part I of Schedule 2 of the Act. 
67
  No 3 of 1957. 
68
  Du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act Service 40 (2008) s 277 pg 28-12. 
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CHAPTER 4 
JUDICIAL DISCRETION AND DEPARTURE 
FROM THE PRESCRIBED SENTENCE 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the developmental issues relating to judicial discretion and the 
departure from the prescribed sentences will be discussed. 
 
Section 51(3)(a) of the Act provides that a court which has convicted a person of an 
offence referred to in Part I or II of schedule 2, shall, if satisfied that substantial and 
compelling circumstances exist which justify the imposition of a lesser sentence than 
the sentence prescribed in those subsections, enter those circumstances on the 
record of the proceedings and may thereupon impose such lesser sentence.  
 
Terblanche69 submits that mandatory and minimum sentences are not new or 
unfamiliar phenomena in the South African criminal justice system, nor has either 
ever been accepted without displeasure from our judiciary.  He further submits that 
the Act is no different and that the judiciary‟s basic objection against such sentences 
is that they reduce the courts to rubber stamps; violate the independence of the 
courts as well as the principle of the separation of constitutional powers.  These 
comments are supported by the case of S v Toms; S v Bruce70 where Smalberger JA 
held that the infliction of punishment is a matter for the discretion of the trial Court; 
mandatory sentences reduce the normal sentencing function of the court to the level 
of a rubber stamp.  
 
The term “substantial and compelling circumstances” is new to South African law and 
it is not defined in the Act.  However, in terms of section 51(3)(aA) of the Act some 
guidance has now been provided to identify the factors that shall not constitute 
substantial and compelling circumstances in respect of the offence of rape.  This 
phrase appears to have been borrowed from the American sentencing practice 
                                                          
69
  “Aspects of minimum sentence legislation: judicial comment and the courts‟ jurisdiction” Vol 14 
No 1 (2001) SACJ 2. 
70
  Fn 4 at 806h – 807b; 822c-d and 830j - 831b. 
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entitled Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.  However, Van Zyl Smit71 affirms that the 
term “substantial and compelling circumstances” is not found in South African law but 
appears to have been borrowed from modern American sentencing practice.  In S v 
Malgas72 the court held that it was significant to note that the legislature had refrained 
from giving such guidance as was done in Minnesota from where the concept of 
“substantial and compelling circumstances” was derived.   
 
The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines provide a list of factors that may be regarded 
as substantial and compelling circumstances, for example: 
 
(a)  the fact that the victim was an aggressor in the incident; 
 
(b) the offender played a minor role in the commission of the offence or 
participated as a result of coercion or duress; 
 
(c) the offender as a result of physical or mental impairment, lacked substantial 
capacity when the offence was committed and finally; 
 
(d)  any other substantial ground which tends to excuse the offender‟s culpability.  
 
However, voluntary use of drugs or alcohol may not be considered as far as the 
offender‟s impairment or lack of substantial capacity.  Likewise a list of factors that 
may not be considered as grounds for departure is provided in these guidelines, 
which includes race; sex; educational background and marital status. It is noted that 
these guidelines focus mainly on the seriousness of the offence and the moral 
blameworthiness of the accused in respect of the crime.  The fact that the Act does 
not define substantial and compelling circumstances in the same fashion as in 
Minnesota has become a matter of real concern.  Roth73 expresses the view that 
failure of Parliament to define this term has undermined the Act‟s endeavour to 
promote uniformity.  The Commission also recognised this as a weakness which may 
                                                          
71
  “Mandatory minimum sentence and departures from them in substantial and compelling 
circumstances (1999) 15 SAJHR 270 at 271. 
72
  2001 (1) SACR 469 (SCA) at para [18]. 
73
  Fn 32.  
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be cured through the interpretation of the words by re-introducing the existing 
principles.  
 
Van Zyl Smit74 submits that in the past when confronted with mandatory sentences 
for murder without extenuating circumstances, South African courts proved adept at 
developing criteria for identifying mitigating circumstances by including all those 
circumstances that diminished the moral blameworthiness of the offender‟s conduct. 
He further submits that although the application of this test was not uncontroversial, it 
greatly widened the discretion of the courts whilst still structuring the decision-making 
process.  He submits further that the current legislation demands a similar judicial 
initiative in determining what circumstances are relevant to deciding whether 
„substantial and compelling circumstances‟ exist.  Finally he submits that if this is 
done rigorously and systematically it could go a long way towards balancing the clear 
legislative desire to encourage the courts to impose heavier sentences on the 
grounds of deterrence or incapacitation, with the avoidance of sentences that are 
grossly disproportionate to the specific crimes committed.  
 
The Minnesota approach of focussing on the seriousness of the offence and moral 
blameworthiness of the offender was also confirmed by Davis J in S v Schwartz and 
Another75 where he emphasised the principle of just deserts or the retributive theory.  
Kruger76 also holds the view that section 51 shifts the emphasis to the objective 
gravity of the offence and the public‟s need for effective sanctions against it.  
 
4.2 THE INTERPRETATION OF THE PHRASE “SUBSTANTIAL AND 
COMPELLING CIRCUMSTANCES” 
 
The meaning of the phrase substantial and compelling circumstances has been 
considered in a number of cases where the minimum sentence prescribed by section 
51 has been passed, thus presenting three different extremes of the spectrum.  At 
the one extreme there is a case of S v Mofokeng and Another77 where Stegmann J 
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  Fn 56 at 275 – 276. 
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  1999 (2) SACR 380 (C) at 387 g. 
76
  Kruger Hiemstra’s Criminal Procedure (Commentary) [Issue 2] 19. 
77
  1999 (1) SACR 502 (W). 
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was of the view that this phrase leaves the trial court with almost no discretion and in 
fact compelled the court to impose the minimum sentence.  
 
The court further held: 
 
“Therefore, I consider it to be clear enough that, for substantial and compelling 
circumstances to be found, the facts of the particular case must present some 
circumstance that is exceptional in nature and that so obviously exposes the 
injustice of the statutorily prescribed sentence in the particular case, that it can 
rightly be described as „compelling‟ the conclusion that the imposition of a lesser 
sentence than that prescribed by Parliament is justified”.
78 
 
The learned judge further held that “substantial and compelling circumstances” mean 
the factors of an unusual and exceptional kind that Parliament cannot be supposed to 
have had in contemplation when prescribing standard penalties for certain crimes 
committed in circumstances described in Schedule 2.79  This judgement was followed 
in S v Segole and Another80 where Jordaan AJ held that “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” would be some circumstance so exceptional in nature and so 
obviously exposing injustice of the statutorily prescribed sentence, that it compelled 
the conclusion that lesser than the prescribed sentence is justified. 
 
This approach was again followed in S v Zitha and Others81 where Goldstone J held 
that the Legislature has laid down heavy minimum sentences in most, if not all the 
cases, which would seem substantially in excess of those imposed by the courts until 
now.  Roth refers to this approach as a strict interpretation.82 
 
At the other extreme in S v Majalefa and Another83 Leveson J was of the opinion that 
the expression “substantial and compelling circumstances” was intended to denote 
factors of solid material significance in relation to all other component factors which 
must irresistibly be taken into consideration for the purpose of sentence.  The 
sentence must not lead to an injustice.  In other words the court was of the view that 
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  Fn 53 at 523 c-d. 
79
  Fn 53 at 524 c-d. 
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  1999 (2) SACR 115 (W). 
81
  Fn 44 
82
  Fn 32 pg 5. 
83
  Fn 42 pg 6. 
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the words “substantial and compelling” were just a confirmation of the traditional 
discretional principles of sentencing and that the consideration of aggravating and 
mitigating circumstances should still remain a point of departure.  Roth84 refers to this 
as a lenient interpretation.  
 
Both extremes were endorsed in the other divisions of the High Court.  In S v 
Madondo85 Squires J emphasised that the intention of parliament was that penalties 
for rape of a girl under the age of 16 should be increased and that the court would 
not easily intervene to impose a lesser sentence as compelling reasons for doing so 
would not be lightly found.  He explained that a “compelling” reason meant more than 
just a disparity between what the court feels may be sufficient and the prescribed 
minimum.  The court further that to consider such a difference alone as constituting 
compelling reasons would be subversive of the legislature‟s intention.  He explained 
that compelling was a “strong” word that meant “„almost irresistible‟, constituting at 
least a strongly sensed obligation”.  He went on to state that factors such as the age 
of the girl; “nearly sixteen years or sixteen months”, or whether she was physically 
harmed or not, would usually not come into play for the purpose of sentencing under 
the new Act. 
 
The third approach is the one that falls somewhere between the above two extremes.  
This approach was followed in S v Blaauw86 where Borchers J found that the Act did 
narrow the discretion that the courts had previously had to impose sentence and that 
it did so more rigorously than if the court had merely had to find that there were 
circumstances that justified it departing from prescribed sentence. 
 
The court further held that the legislature has not seen it fit to describe what factors 
may or may not be considered.  Further that the court is still able to have regard to all 
the factors which would traditionally have been considered in imposing sentence.  
That a court should not consider each factor in isolation but view them cumulatively 
and if, on doing so, the court forms the view that, bearing in mind all the factors, 
aggravating as well as mitigating, a sentence of life imprisonment would be grossly 
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  Fn 67. 
85
  Unreported judgment of the NPD, case CC22/99, delivered on 30 March 1999. 
86
  Fn 41. 
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disproportionate to the crime committed or, to put it differently, startlingly 
inappropriate or offensive to its sense of justice, then it should find that substantial 
and compelling circumstances exist for departing from the prescribed sentence of life 
imprisonment.  That in such circumstances a court would not be substituting its own 
discretion for that of the Legislature, for the Legislature had not intended that unfair 
or grossly disproportionate sentences should be imposed.87 
  
In supporting the approach in S v Blaauw, Willis J in S v Dithotze88 decided that the 
court is still able to have  regard to all factors which would traditionally have been 
relevant in imposing sentence, if the court, after considering all factors, forms the 
view that a sentence of life imprisonment would be grossly disproportionate to the 
crime committed or disturbingly inappropriate or offensive to its sense of justice, it 
should find that substantial and compelling circumstances exist for departing from a 
prescribed sentence of life imprisonment.  In S v Jansen89 Davis J held that, in 
considering the imposition of a minimum sentence in terms of sections 51, 52 and 53 
of Act, the court is to consider all available mitigating factors to determine whether 
they are of substantial weight thus enabling the court to exercise its discretion to 
provide for a reduced sentence.  The court further held that the term “substantial and 
compelling circumstances” refers to weight rather than to exception. 
 
In S v Van Wyk90 Davis J held that the Act derived its jurisprudential heritage from 
Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines.  The court further held that the phrase “substantial 
and compelling circumstances” included all those factors which had previously been 
referred to as mitigating circumstances and included all the circumstances which 
might indicate a diminished moral blameworthiness on the part of the offender.  
 
In the seminal judgment of S v Malgas91 the court provided some important 
guidelines to be considered when interpreting the term “substantial and compelling 
circumstances”.  Marais JA held that the court may not depart from the specified 
sentences lightly and for flimsy reasons which could not withstand scrutiny.  The 
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  Fn 61 at 311 f-i. 
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  1999 (2) SACR 324 (W). 
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  1999 (2) SACR 368 (C). 
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  2000 (1) SACR 45 (C). 
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  Fn 72. 
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court further held that no factors are excluded from consideration and that what the 
term was apt to convey, is that the cumulative impact of those circumstances must be 
such as to justify a departure.  He further rejected the dicta which suggest that for 
circumstances to quality as substantial and compelling they must be “exceptional” in 
the sense of seldom encountered or rare further that it would be an impossible task 
to attempt to catalogue exhaustively either those circumstances or combinations of 
circumstances which could rank as substantial and compelling and those which could 
not.  He further held that what stands out quite clearly is that the courts are a good 
deal freer to depart from the prescribed sentences than have been supposed to be in 
some of the previously decided cases and that it is they who are to judge whether or 
not the circumstances of any particular case are such as to justify a departure.  He 
then summarised the step by step procedure to be followed in applying the test to the 
actual sentencing situation.92 
 
The interpretation of “substantial and compelling circumstances” as enunciated in S v 
Malgas was affirmed by Ackerman J in S v Dodo.93  The court held that this 
interpretation was an overarching guideline that the court endorsed as a practical 
method to be employed by all judicial officers faced with the application of section 
51of the Act.  Further that It had to be refined and particularised on a case by case 
basis, as the need arose.  Further that It steered an appropriate path, which the 
Legislature doubtless intended, respecting the legislature‟s decision to ensure that 
consistently heavier sentences are imposed in relation to the serious crimes covered 
by section 51of the Act and at the same time promoting the sprit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights.  The court also emphasised that in considering the existence of 
substantial and compelling circumstances, a court is not prohibited by the Act from 
weighing all the usual considerations traditionally relevant to sentence.94 
 
The court also found that section 51(1) is not unconstitutional, stating that under the 
Constitution there is no absolute separation between judiciary, legislative and 
executive functions.  The court held further that the legislature and the executive 
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  2001 (1) SACR 594 (CC). 
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  Fn 67para [40]. 
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share an interest in the punishment to be imposed by the courts.95  Further that 
section 51(1) does not have the effect of depriving the courts of their sentencing 
powers in such a manner and to such degree that they can no longer be described 
as “ordinary” courts.96  In S v Abrahams,97 Cameron J A (as he then was) in 
interpreting the phrase “substantial and compelling circumstances”, recognised that 
some rapes are worse than the others and held that the life sentence ordained by the 
Legislature should be reserved for cases devoid of substantial factors compelling the 
conclusion that such sentence is inappropriate and unjust.98  The court further 
referred to the weighing of all the circumstances of a case, while giving due regard to 
the legislative benchmark created by the Act and taking into account special 
circumstances of a case.99  The court then confirmed that there were substantial and 
compelling circumstances but felt that the sentence of seven years imprisonment 
was not appropriate and increased it to twelve years imprisonment.  
 
Mpati J A in S v Mahomotsa,100 referred to the decisions in Malgas and Dodo, and 
held that, which sentence should be imposed once substantial and compelling 
circumstances are found to exist, is within the sentencing discretion of the trial court, 
subject of course to the obligation cast upon it by the Act to take due cognisance of 
the legislature‟s desire for firmer punishment than that which may have been thought 
to be appropriate in the past.  The court further held that even in cases falling within 
the categories delineated in the Act, there are bound to be differences in the degree 
of their seriousness.  Further that there should be no misunderstanding about this as 
they will all be serious but some will be more serious than others and that subject to 
the caveat that follows, it is only right that the differences in seriousness should 
receive recognition when it comes to the meting out of punishment. 
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  Fn 67 paras [22] and [23]. 
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  2002 (1) SACR 116 (SCA). 
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  Fn 69 at para [29]. 
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In S v Vermeulen,101 Mthiyane JA held that factors advanced as being “substantial 
and compelling” enough to lead to a lesser sentence cannot be considered in vacuo; 
due weight must be given to them in the context of the case, together with all the 
aggravating factors and the interests of the community. 
 
In S v Mvamvu,102 Mthiyane JA considered the guidelines I and J as set out in S v 
Malgas and held that bearing the benchmark in mind, the court must give due weight 
to the aggravating and mitigating circumstances and the special circumstances of a 
particular case.103  In Director of Public Prosecutions, KwaZulu- Natal v Ngcobo and 
Others104 Navsa J A referring to Malgas decision held that a departure from the 
prescribed minimum sentence is justified if an injustice would result from imposing 
such sentence. 
 
The Constitutional Court per Cameron J in Centre of Child Law v Minister of Justice 
and Constitutional Development and Others105 also affirmed the interpretation 
adopted in S v Malgas, stating that under the minimum sentencing regime the 
discretion entrusted to courts of law was not expunged, but was substantially 
constrained.  
 
He further held that for sentencing courts it was no longer to be business as usual: 
 
“First, a court was not to be given a clean slate on which to inscribe whatever 
sentence it thought fit.  Instead, it was required to approach that question 
conscious of the fact that the Legislature has ordained life imprisonment or a 
particular prescribed period of imprisonment as the sentence which should 
ordinarily be imposed for the commission of the listed crimes in the specified 
circumstances.  In short the Legislature aimed at ensuring a severe standardised, 
and consistent response from the courts to the commission of such crimes unless 
there were and could be seen to be truly convincing reasons for a different 
response”  
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30 
The court followed the same interpretation in S v Ntsheno,106 where Willis J 
concluded that Stegmann J was wrong in his interpretation of substantial and 
compelling circumstances, and his conclusion that he was obliged to impose 
prescribed minimum sentence.  He further held that the very factors in this case 
which Stegmann J considered could not be taken into account had to be considered, 
for example, the absence of previous convictions, the comparative youthfulness of 
the offenders, the unfortunate factors in their backgrounds, the probable effect upon 
them of the liquor which they had taken, the absence of dangerous weapons and the 
fact that the complainant had not suffered serious injury.  He further held that upon 
reading the evidence as a whole, it would not seem to be undue speculation in favour 
of the appellant to conclude that he acted under the influence of at least some of the 
others upon considering the aggregate effect of all the factors mentioned herein.  
 
He found that minimum sentence was clearly disproportionate to the crime hence he 
ultimately found that substantial and compelling circumstances existed.  He then set 
aside the sentence of life imprisonment and substituted same with 19 years 
imprisonment on each count of rape but ordered the sentences to run concurrently.  
However, it is interesting to note that the appellant had been sentenced to life 
imprisonment as accused no 2 together with accused no1 by Stegmann J in the case 
of S v Mofokeng and Another.107  When the court affirmed the Malgas approach in S 
v Selebi,108 Joffe J held that the courts in departing from the minimum sentence 
prescribed, they are to respect, and not merely pay lip service to, the Legislature‟s 
view that the prescribed periods of imprisonment are to be taken to be ordinarily 
appropriate when crimes of the specified kind are committed.109 
 
In S v Matyityi110 the court as per Ponnan JA held that Malgas had set out how the 
minimum sentencing regime should be approached and in particular how the inquiry 
into substantial and compelling circumstances is to be conducted by a court.111 
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4.3 CRITICISM OF MALGAS DECISION 
 
This decision has not been free from criticism, despite the fact that it has been widely 
recognised by the courts for its seminal nature on the interpretation of the term 
“substantial and compelling circumstances”. 
 
In S v Kgafela Friedman JP remarked that the terms “substantial and compelling 
circumstances” had not been textually interpreted in S v Malgas but had been 
relegated to the effect of an instinctive reaction, and response, taking refuge in the 
notion of injustice or unjust sentences, resulting in the imposition of a lesser sentence 
bearing in mind the well-known triad of the criminal, the crime and interests of the 
society.  He further held that the court had failed to interpret what was meant by this 
phrase.  In S v Vuma112 Du Toit AJ had the following to say “ however, since S51 of 
the Act has received the nod of approval from both the Supreme Court of Appeal in, 
for example, S v Malgas, and the Constitutional Court in S v Dodo,  I am precluded 
from questioning its validity or Constitutionality and must per force interpret it as best 
I can and give effect to the intention of the Legislature in enacting it but I would be 
failing in my duty if in doing so I did not always voice my protest at what is surely the 
most invasive piece of legislation enacted since the advent of the democratic South 
Africa and I respectfully associate myself with the sentiments expressed by 
Stegmann J in S v Mofokeng and Another. 
 
It is submitted that, despite criticism, the decision in Malgas has laid the foundation 
for the interpretation of the “term substantial and compelling circumstances” by our 
courts.  The approach adopted by the court in Malgas clearly endorses the view 
expressed by van Zyl Smit.113  This is supported by Du Toit et al114 who submit that 
the approach adopted by the court in Malgas will remain valid despite the changes to 
the Act which came into operation on 31 December 2007.  It is further submitted that 
the sentencing regime adopted in section 51 of the Act falls squarely within the four 
corners of the sentencing model entitled the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines. 
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While the problems attending judicial discretion and the departure from the 
prescribed minimum sentence appear to have been settled, it is also necessary to 
review the other relevant provisions of the Act which are discussed in the next 
chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE APPLICATION OF MINIMUM SENTENCES 
 
5.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the application of minimum sentences will be discussed under the 
headings below. 
 
5.2 SUSPENSION OF PRESCRIBED MINIMUM SENTENCE 
 
Section 297(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 reads: 
 
“where a court convicts a person of an offence in respect of which any law 
prescribes a minimum punishment, the court may in its discretion pass sentence 
but order the operation of a part thereof to be suspended for a period not 
exceeding five years or any condition referred to in paragraph (a) (i) of subsection 
(1).” 
 
Section 51(5)(a) of the Act, clearly provides that the sentence under section 51 may 
not be suspended as contemplated in section 297(4) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 
1977.  However, a lesser sentence that the court imposes upon finding substantial 
and compelling circumstances can be suspended in terms of section 297 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act, 1977.  This arises from the fact that, the court retains its 
ordinary sentencing jurisdiction once substantial and compelling circumstances are 
found to exist. 
 
Section 276(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 reads: 
 
“Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any law contained, other than the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1977 (Act No 105 of 1997), the provisions of 
subsection (1) shall not be construed as prohibiting the court – 
 
(a) from imposing imprisonment together with correctional supervision; or 
 
(b) from imposing the punishment referred to in subsection (1)(h) or (i) in 
respect of any offence, whether under common law or statutory provision 
irrespective of whether the law in question provides for such or any other 
punishment;  Provided that any punishment contemplated in this paragraph 
may not be imposed in any case where the court is obliged to impose a 
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sentence contemplated in section 51(1) or (2), read with section 52, of the 
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1977.” 
 
Section 276(3)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977, clearly provides, that 
correctional supervision cannot be imposed when the court is obliged to impose a 
sentence contemplated in section 51(1) or (2) of the Act. 
 
Section 51(5)(b) of the Act has brought about a change in the sense that it allows a 
court to suspend half of the prescribed minimum sentence if the accused was 
between the age of 16 and 18 years at the time of the commission of an offence in 
question.  The position of this category of the accused and the interpretation of this 
section is dealt with below.115 
 
5.3 SENTENCING JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS IN TERMS OF THE ACT 
 
5.3.1 THE POSITION OF THE DISTRICT COURTS 
 
Section 51(1) and (2) of the Act makes reference to only the High Courts and the 
Regional Courts respectively.  The Act does not refer to district courts at all.  
Terblanche116 submits that it was indeed the intention of the legislature not to affect 
the district magistrates‟ courts at all, and that they should disregard the provisions of 
the Act. 
 
The question whether this legislation affected the district courts had presented itself 
before some provincial divisions of the High Court but it was left undecided.117  
However, in Jimenez v S118 Lewis AJA settled this question once and for all by 
holding that district magistrates‟ courts are not bound to impose the minimum 
sentences prescribed.  Olivier JA adopted a different approach but agreed with Lewis 
AJA and stated that a district court is not entitled to apply the minimum sentence 
                                                          
115
  Para 4.4.2. 
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  Fn 69. 
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  S v Khanjwayo; S v Mihlali 1999 (2) SACR 651 (O) and S v McCoulagh 2000 (1) SACR 542 
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  2003] 1 All SA 535 (SCA) para [4]. 
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provisions under consideration and that the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 
1997 is clear and unambiguous in this respect.119 
 
5.3.2 REGIONAL AND THE HIGH COURTS  
 
The position of these courts was governed by section 52 of the Act prior to the repeal 
of sections 52 and 53 of the Act on 31 December 2007.  Whereas these sections 
have been repealed and in view of the transitional provisions as contained in section 
53A of the Act, it is necessary that the provisions of the defunct section 52 be 
discussed.  Section 53A of the Act provides for the cases that were pending in the 
Regional Court under section 52 of the Act as on the 31 December 2007.  Prior to 31 
December 2007 the position was that a Regional Court convicting the accused of an 
offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 of the Act, would commit the accused to 
the High Court for sentence.  
 
This arose from the fact that the regional court does not have jurisdiction, in terms of 
its ordinary jurisdiction to impose the mandatory life imprisonment prescribed after 
conviction of such offence and it was only logical for such a case to be transferred to 
the High Court for sentencing.  Terblanche120 holds the view that, in fact, the whole of 
section 52 would have had little practical purpose, if it was not intended specifically 
for this purpose.  This view appears to have been endorsed by some divisions of the 
High Court.121  However some courts took an opposite view in this regard raising 
reservations about, among other things, the poor draftsman ship of this legislation 
and found the procedure in section 52 unpopular.  In S v Mofokeng and Another,122 
Stegmann J expressed the view that if mandatory life imprisonment was to be 
imposed the entire trial should take place in the High Court.  In S v Swartz and 
Another,123 Davis J expressed himself as follows:  
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“this court now finds itself in the position of a chain novelist.  The first chapter has 
been written by another court and this Court is now expected to complete the 
work on the basis of a framework determined by another author.  It is a most 
unsatisfactory system.” 
 
Where the Regional Court convicted the accused of an offence not attracting 
minimum sentence simultaneously with the offence referred to in Part I of Schedule 2 
to the Act, the regional court was required to simultaneously commit the accused for 
sentencing by the High Court in respect of all the counts.  In S v Shezi and 
Another,124 the court held that if the regional court sentenced the accused in respect 
of the offences not attracting minimum sentence, the High Court will set those 
sentences aside and impose the sentence afresh. 
 
The jurisdictional facts for the application of section 52 of the Act were spelt out by 
Stegmann J in S v Mofokeng and Another125 as follows: 
 
(a) a regional court must have convicted an accused of an offence committed 
after the commencement of sections 51 and 52 on 1 May 1998; 
 
(b) the offence must be one referred to in Schedule 2 of Act 105 of 1997; 
 
(c) the magistrate must not have imposed sentence; 
 
(d) the accused was not under the age of sixteen years at the time of the 
commission of the act that constituted the offence; 
 
(e) the Schedule 2 offence must be one in respect of which section 51 invests a 
regional court with penal jurisdiction; 
 
(f) the magistrate must have formed the opinion that the offence merits 
punishment in excess of the penal jurisdiction of the regional court in terms of 
section 51; 
 
(g) the magistrate must have stopped the proceedings and committed the 
accused for sentencing to the High Court having jurisdiction; 
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(h) the High Court must be one having jurisdiction. 
 
Once the accused was committed to the High Court for sentencing, the following 
procedure would obtain in the High Court: 
 
1. If on the record there was doubt whether the conviction was in accordance 
with justice, the judge would direct an inquiry to the regional court magistrate 
as contemplated in section 52(3)(b) of the Act. 
 
2. (a) If the accused pleaded guilty in the regional court, that plea would stand 
unless the accused satisfied the court that the plea or any admissions 
made were incorrectly recorded.  Unless the court was satisfied that the 
plea of guilty was incorrectly recorded or was not satisfied that the 
accused was guilty, the court would make a formal finding of guilty and 
proceed with sentencing.126 
 
(b) If the accused pleaded not guilty in the regional court, the judgment of 
the regional court would stand and be sufficient for the high Court to 
pass sentence.127 
 
(c)  If there was doubt about the conviction, the high court would direct an 
inquiry to the regional court magistrate. 
 
(d)  Doubt about the correctness of the conviction could be raised by a 
reading of the record or in the form of submissions by counsel for the 
accused or the state. 
 
(e)  If counsel raised issues constituting cause for doubt, the judge would 
decide whether such doubt warranted an inquiry to the magistrate.  If it 
did not, the judge would proceed with sentencing. 
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  S 52(2)(a) and (b). 
127
  S 52(3)(d). 
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(f)  If the magistrate‟s response eliminated all doubt, the judge confirmed 
the conviction and proceeded with the sentence proceedings.128 
 
3. If the judge or the legal representative of the accused was still not satisfied 
that the conviction was in order, the legal representative could request the 
judge to call further witnesses.  The court could, of course, also call 
witnesses.  Such calling of witness did not infringe on the right of the accused 
not to be exposed twice to the same offence (double jeopardy).129 
 
4. The judge decided whether such witnesses were to be called or not.130  
 
5. The accused could not be forced to testify, even if he or she testified in the 
regional court.131 
 
6. Only in exceptional circumstances could the findings on the merits be 
revisited at the sentencing stage.132 
 
7. The accused‟s fundamental constitutional right to a fair trial had to be borne 
in mind at all times. 
 
8. The judge had to make rulings from time to time to ensure that the accused 
and defence witnesses were not treated unjustly or unfairly. 
 
The constitutional validity of section 52 was challenged in S v Dzukuda133 and the 
court held that this section was not unconstitutional. 
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5.4 CHILD OFFENDERS 
 
5.4.1 CHILDREN UNDER THE AGE OF 16 YEARS 
 
Section 51 (7) of the Act clearly provides that section 51 does not apply to the 
accused person who was under the age of 16 years at the time of the commission of 
an offence in question.  What is important in this category of children is the date on 
which the offence was committed.  In S v Nkosi,134 Cachalia J held that the Act was 
not applicable to children under the age of 16 and that this meant that a court was 
unencumbered by any legislative prescriptions in deciding an appropriate form of 
punishment for such offender.  Terblanche135 is of the view that, this means that the 
general principles regarding sentencing of children should be followed in this 
category of children. 
 
5.4.2  CHILDREN BETWEEN 16 AND 18 YEARS OF AGE 
 
Prior to 31 December 2007, the position of this category of children was governed by 
the defunct section 51(3)(b) of the Act which was repealed by Act 38 of 2007.  This 
section read as follows: 
 
“If any court referred to in subsection (1) and (2) decides to impose a sentence 
prescribed in those subsections upon a child who was 16 years of age or older, 
but under the age of 18 years, at the time of the commission of the act which 
constituted the offence in question, it shall enter the reasons for its decision on 
the record of the proceedings.” 
 
Terblanche136 in dealing with this category of children submits as follows: 
 
“Therefore, if a regional court convicts an offender of 16 or 17 years old at the 
time of the commission of the offence, of an offence referred to in subsection 
51(1) and it does not decide that the prescribed sentence of life imprisonment 
should be imposed, it need not enter any specific reasons on the record and can 
impose any appropriate sentence within its jurisdiction. It is only required to enter 
reasons on the record if it decides to impose a sentence referred to in subsection 
(1), and then, due to the provisions of subsections 52(1) and 51(1), the regional 
court must stop the proceedings and refer the offender to the High Court for 
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sentencing.  Although such an interpretation does not fit seamlessly into every 
provision of sections 51 to 53, neither does any other.  However, it is submitted 
that this literal interpretation serves the interests of the criminal justice system as 
a whole and those of the juvenile offender in particular.” 
 
The meaning of this section has occasioned some debate, with conflicting decision of 
the High Courts as to how to approach minimum sentences where this category of 
children is involved.  
 
In S v Blaauw,137 Van Heerden J held that a court was not obliged in terms of section 
51(3)(b) to impose the minimum sentence on a child who, at the time of the 
commission of the offence was 16 or 17 years old, unless the state satisfied the court 
that the circumstances justified the imposition of such sentence. 
 
The court in S v Nkosi138 held that the express wording of this section only required a 
court to justify a decision to impose the prescribed sentence by entering its reasons 
on the record.  It held further, that the wording did not limit the court‟s discretion to 
impose an appropriate sentence on this class of offender.  Held, further that a court 
was therefore free to apply the usual sentencing criteria in deciding on an appropriate 
sentence for a child between the ages of 16 and 18. 
 
However in Direkteur Van Openbare Vervolgings, Transvaal v Makwetsja139 
Bertelsmann J held that minimum sentences should be imposed on children between 
16 and 18 years only in extreme cases, but that does not mean that the Legislature 
did not intend that the minimum sentences are applicable to everyone above the age 
of 16 years.  That the Legislature decreed in section 51(3)(b) that a court must make 
doubly sure that the prescribed minimum sentence is appropriate for a child between 
the ages of 16 and 18 years followed the established approach of all civilized 
countries that the youth of children should be accepted as a mitigating circumstance 
which would normally lead to a lesser sentence unless there are extreme aggravating 
factors present. 
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The debate was laid to rest in S v B,140 where Ponnan AJA held that the minimum 
sentencing legislation must be read in the light of the values enshrined in the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, and interpreted in a manner that 
respects those values.  Further that section 51 distinguishes between adult offenders 
and child offenders.  That section 28 of the Constitution defines a child as a person 
under the age of 18 years.  Further that two categories of child offenders are 
envisaged by the Act; first, those below the age of 16; and second, those between 
the ages of 16 and 18.141 
 
The court further held that for child offenders between the ages of 16 and 18, the 
sentencing court starts with a clean slate subject to the weighting effect of the 
statutorily prescribed minimum sentences, the sentencing court is free to impose.  
That it may decide in the exercise of its sentencing discretion to impose the minimum 
sentence prescribed by section 51(2) for an offence of the kind specified in Schedule 
2.142  The court referred to case of V v United Kingdom143 in disapproving of the 
approach in Makwetsja.144 
 
The court further held that for a court to expect a child offender under 18 to establish 
the existence of substantial and compelling circumstances in order to escape the 
prescribed minimum sentence, would amount to burdening such child offender in the 
same way as an offender over 18.  The court held that this would infringe the 
principle that imprisonment as a sentencing option should be used for child offenders 
as a last resort and only for the shortest appropriate period of time.145  The court also 
affirmed the approach in Blaauw and Nkosi decisions endorsing that these judgments 
accorded generally with internationally recognized trends and constitutionally 
acceptable principles relating to the sentencing of child offenders.146   
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Finally the court summarised the sentencing principles in this category as follows:147 
 
“(a) The legislative scheme entails that the fact that an offender is under 18 
although over 16 at the time of the offence automatically confers a 
discretion on the sentencing Court which is without more, free to depart 
from the prescribed minimum sentence. 
 
(b) In consequence, the sentencing Court is generally free to apply the usual 
sentencing criteria in deciding on an appropriate sentence.  
 
(c) The offender under 18 though over 16 does not have to establish the 
existence of substantial and compelling circumstances because s 51(3) 
finds no application to him or her. 
 
(d) By contrast with the class of offender under 16, however, the statutory 
scheme requires that the sentencing Court should take into account the fact 
that the Legislature has ordinarily ordained the prescribed sentences for the 
offences in question.  This operates as a weighting factor in the sentencing 
process. 
 
(e) It follows on this approach that where the provisions of section 51(2) apply, 
the regional court retains its competence to finalise the matter contrary to 
the conclusion in Makwetsja.” 
 
This approach was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal per Brand JA in S v 
Gagu and Another.148  In the recent Constitutional Court judgment of Centre for Child 
Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others149 the majority 
confirmed the High Court ruling on the constitutional validity of the current section 
51(5)(b) and section 51(b) of the Act.  The court acknowledged that the current 
Amendments to the Act had been necessitated by the Supreme Court in S v B above 
which had ruled that the regime did not apply to children under the age of 18.  The 
Constitutional Court further recognised that instead of excluding the children under 
the age of 18 years from the regime the government, in creating sections 51(5)(b) 
and 51(6), had reverted to its original objective of including 16 and 17 year old 
offenders in the minimum sentencing regime and to exclude only the under 16s.  The 
court further held that the Bill of Rights in our Constitution amply embodies these 
internationally accepted principles and that its provisions merely need to be given 
their intended effect.  The court further held that no maintainable justification has 
been advanced for including 16 and 17 years olds in the minimum sentencing 
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regime.  Further that Legislation cannot take away the right of 16 and 17 year olds to 
be detained only as a last resort, and for the shortest appropriate period of time, 
without reasons being provided that specifically relate to this group and explain the 
need to change the Constitutional disposition applying to them.150  Further that such 
an approach was based on several international law instruments which count in 
favour of the view that minimum sentences should not apply to child offenders.151 
 
Finally the court declared sections 51(1) and (2) unconstitutional and invalid to the 
extent that they apply to persons who were under 18 years of age at the time of the 
commission of the offence.  The court further declared sections 51(5)(b) and 51(6) 
inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid.  The court further held that to remedy 
the defect section 51(6) of the Act is to read as though it provides as follows:  
 
“This section does not apply in respect of an accused person who was under the 
age of 18 years at the time of the commission of an offence contemplated in 
subsection (1) and (2).” 
 
The effect of this judgment is that the position of this category of children is now very 
clear and that the Act needs to be amended accordingly and as a matter of urgency 
in order to avoid any further confusion in practice.  The rest of the provisions of the 
Act are self-explanatory hence they are not discussed in this study.  The impact of 
and response, to minimum sentence legislation will be discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER 6 
THE IMPACT OF AND RESPONSE TO MINIMUM SENTENCE 
LEGISLATION 
 
6.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter the impact and the responses to minimum sentence legislation will be 
discussed. 
 
In 1998 the then Minister of Justice appointed a new project committee which was 
chaired by Professor Dirk van Zyl Smith to investigate sentencing reform and the 
position of the victims of the criminal justice system.  Between June 1999 and 
January 2000 the committee undertook empirical studies on the sentencing patterns 
pre and post the introduction of the Act.  This also included the attitudes of the key 
role players towards the Act.  In this regard the Commission subcontracted the 
University of Cape Town‟s Institute of Criminology to perform the quantitative aspect 
of the research where after a report was developed in June 2000.152  The Institute of 
Security Studies and Technikon South Africa conducted a parallel qualitative 
investigation into the attitudes of the judicial officers and the other role players to the 
act, and sentencing in general.153 
 
Another research was conducted by Hlakanaphila Analytics who were commissioned 
by the Open Society Foundation of South Africa.154  This project was to find the 
actual impact of the act compared to its stated objectives and whether the concerns 
that had been raised were valid.  This research methodology, like that of the 
Commission, involved interviews with role players in the justice system, a review of 
the relevant case law, analysis of data from SAPS, NPA and the Department of 
Correctional service, and a survey of closed cases involving serious offences in three 
Regional Courts. 
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Following on these reports the response and impact of this legislation are briefly 
discussed as follows: 
 
6.2  JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE/DISCRETION 
 
The research revealed that the concerns regarding judicial independence were not 
born out after the Malgas decision which came up with a clear interpretation of the 
phrase “substantial and compelling circumstances” as provided for in section 51(3) of 
the Act. 
 
6.3 PRISON OVERCROWDING 
 
This Act made a substantial contribution to changing the profile of South Africa‟s 
sentenced prison population.  However the effects of the Act were not immediate.  
First, for the first two years of its operation, there was no impact at all.  This was due 
to the time lag from the date of implementation of the Act, the commission of 
offences after that date and detection, prosecution, conviction and sentencing.155 
 
Secondly, it is argued that the impact of the increased jurisdiction of the lower courts 
at around the same time may also have to be factored in, for example, the 
magistrate‟s court‟s maximum was increased from 1 to 3 years and Regional courts 
from 10 years to 15 years.156 
 
Judge Fagan is of the view that the effect of the act has been to greatly increase the 
number of prisoners serving long and life sentences.157  While Giffard and Munting158 
concede that the increase was facilitated and consolidated by these two factors they 
hold the view that the initial impetus came from elsewhere ie a combination of public 
and political pressure on the courts to increase the severity of the sentences  and the 
increase in the jurisdiction of the Magistrate‟s courts.  However, according to 
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Redpath and O‟Donovan,159 prison overcrowding is not a result of minimum 
sentencing because sentencing is respect of offences committed after the act came 
into operation take several years to be served.  They further submit that minimum 
sentencing and associated parole rules will have a profound future impact on 
overcrowding of prisons.  Terblanche160 submits that the magistrates, in particular, 
considered the message from parliament to be clear; sentences for most crimes were 
too lenient and had to be increased substantially and they responded to this 
message immediately. He also refers to the new Correctional Services Act161 for 
example, section 73 read with 73(5)(a) with regard to the release of prisoners serving 
life imprisonment, on parole. 
 
6.4 PREVENTION OF CRIME 
 
According to the literature, the impact of the Act on crime level is negligible.162  They 
support the view that the severity of sentence tends not to operate as a deferent to 
crime but instead only high rates of detection of crime act as a deterrent.163  The 
authors further illustrated this by referring to pick pocketing which was a capital 
offence in Victorian England.  Notwithstanding the punishment of this offence by 
public hangings, offenders did not believe that they would be caught hence they were 
not deterred by the nature of sentence.  The authors hold the view that sentences, 
even the death penalty, are irrelevant to criminals if they do not believe they will be 
caught.  This view was also adopted in Makwanyane case.164  Sloth- Nielson and 
Ehlers165 support the view that the impact of the Act is negligible where they assert 
as follows: 
 
“It can therefore be concluded that at present there is little in the way of reliable 
evidence that the new sentencing law has reduced crime in general, or that the 
commission of the specific offences targeted by this law has been curbed.” 
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6.5 CONSISTENCY IN SENTENCING  
 
As in the discussion in paragraph 5.3 above, the perception has been that the Act 
has had very little impact if any on the consistency in sentencing.  According to 
Terblanche166 the minimum sentences legislation has, if anything, worsened the 
disparities and inconsistencies that prevail in relation to the offences targeted by law. 
Sloth-Nielson and Ehlers167 refer to the arguments submitted by the Western Cape 
Consortium on violence against women, where the latter had reservations about 
Mahamotsa and Abrahams cases which recognised the degrees in seriousness of 
the offences as delineated in the Act for purposes of sentence.  It is submitted, 
though, that despite this concern, the court in these two cases acknowledged that, 
the trial court should take cognisance of the legislature‟s desire for firmer punishment 
than that which may have been thought to be appropriate in the past.  It is further 
submitted that by this conclusion the court was re-affirming and not changing the 
Malgas test. 
 
For instance the Court in Malgas acknowledged that the court must take cognisance 
of the fact that it was not business as usual and that the courts are required to 
approach the imposition of sentence conscious of the fact that the Legislature had 
ordained the particular minimum sentence. 
 
The positive impact is also highlighted by Terblanche168 where he submits that the 
Magistrates had positively considered the massage, from the Parliament, to increase 
sentences to be clear.  The research also acknowledged that sentences had 
increased since the introduction of the Act although they generally remained below 
those that were prescribed as minimum sentences.169 
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6.6 COURT EFFICIENCY 
 
Prior to the current amendments to the Act there was general criticism of the Act 
about the split procedure which was believed to be clogging the rolls in the High 
Court.  Now that the Act has been amended accordingly such criticism appears to be 
waning. 
 
6.7 NON-EXTENSION OR RENEWAL OF THE MINIMUM SENTENCE 
LEGISLATION  
 
The Act has been rendered permanent despite all criticism about it not being a good 
piece of legislation and anticipation that it was not going to be extended.  It is 
important to note that most of the criticism levelled against the Act was addressed by 
the current amendments to the Act, for example, the abolition of the split procedure. 
 
6.8 CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE ACT 
 
The concerns about the constitutionality of the Act were addressed by the 
Constitutional Court in S v Dodo170 where it was decided that section 51(1) of the Act 
was not unconstitutional in that there was no violation of the accused‟s right to fair 
trial in section 35(3)(c) of the Constitution. 
 
Having considered the impact of and response to the Act, a possible solution to the 
problem will be advanced in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
The stated intention of the act has been discussed at length in chapter 2 above.  This 
included, inter alia, consistency in sentencing, the public perceptions that sentences 
were not sufficiently served and deterrence.  The main aim or objective of this study 
is to establish if the intention of the legislature has been achieved by the Act.  In my 
view the Act has achieved its purpose to a certain extent.  
 
The discussion of the impact of the Act in chapter 6 above revealed that not enough 
evidence can be found to support the criticism that existed when the Act was at its 
infant stage.  The current amendments to the Act were implemented in response to 
the proposals that were aimed at improving the Act.  Now that this piece of legislation 
is permanent there is a clear understanding of it through the judicial guidelines, for 
example, the Malgas decision.  The trend in many recent decisions of our courts 
reflects a clear understanding of the correct approach to the interpretation of section 
51 of the Act and in particular the phrase “substantial and compelling circumstances” 
This has therefore enhanced consistency  and parity in the sentencing process.  
 
In response to the question of whether there is a need for a further legislation to 
regulate the sentencing framework in South Africa, it is advanced that the Act in its 
current form appears to have taken care of some recommendations by the 
Commission, thus preparing a fertile ground for the improvement of sentencing in 
South Africa.  It appears though that the current amendments to the Act do not cover 
all the recommendations as proposed in the Sentencing Framework Bill.  In the 
circumstances there is still a need to forge this Bill ahead in order to clearly regulate 
the sentencing framework in South Africa.  This proposal finds support from 
Terblanche171 who recommends that the legislature should pass legislation 
containing the primary sentencing principles as advised by the Law Commission as 
well as legislation to encourage appeal courts to pass guideline judgments.  Further 
that the appellate courts should become more active in providing guidelines in 
judgments requiring increased consistency from the court and that the government 
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should seriously consider establishing a formal sentencing advisory body which, 
based on research and following the gathering of relevant information, can advise the 
government regarding sentencing policy.  He further submits that this approach will 
permit sentencing to evolve rather than to be jerked in a certain direction.172  It is 
finally submitted that the South African sentencing system is in dire need of reform 
and that the State should take the lead in executing the necessary changes, and to 
do so as a role model for our Society.173 
 
However Sloth-Nielsen and Ehlers174 support the Sentencing Framework Bill, but 
hold the view that it never formally entered the public arena due to two possible 
factors: the identified disapproval from some judges regarding the possible limiting of 
their discretion and the fact that there was no co-ordinated strategy or response from 
civil society. 
 
The Commission proposed that as a start, sentencing principles should be clearly 
articulated in legislation.175  It also proposed six potential sentencing schemes as 
reflected in paragraph 1.2 above.  Further to this the Commission recommended the 
establishment of a sentencing council for a particular category or sub-category of 
offences.  The envisaged functions of the proposed Council include the development 
of sentencing guidelines, wide research and consultation before developing 
guidelines, collection and publication of sentencing data, reporting on the efficacy 
and cost effectiveness of the sentencing options, determination of the value of fine 
units and the making of policy recommendations to develop community penalties.176  
It was proposed that the majority of the members should be from the judiciary, as 
they are responsible for sentencing and in this way they will have a major input on 
the shaping of the guidelines themselves.177  It is submitted that is an ideal 
proposition to be applied for South Africa. 
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However, in order to achieve this, it is recommended that the government of South 
Africa should engage in a proper co-ordination of the strategy or response from the 
civil society regarding the Sentencing Framework Bill.  The government should also 
acknowledge the need for judicial guidance in improving sentencing in South Africa 
as exhibited by the Malgas178 judgment which clearly dispels the myth of judicial 
objection to developing sentencing principles in South Africa.  The Commission has 
already conducted a research on the models of sentencing globally and all that 
needs to be done is to adapt same to the South African environment. 
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